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AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE CAPS IN MEDICAL 
MALPRACITCE LITIGATION IMPOSED BY STATE LAWS AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL POLICY AND LAW 
 
Abstract 
Many states have implemented laws which limit non-economic (e.g., pain 
and suffering) damages as a result of medical malpractice.  These laws are 
seen by proponents as reducing medical malpractice insurance costs and 
preserving access to health care – especially for lower income individuals.  
Opponents believe that individuals are harmed through being prevented 
from seeking a full measure of redress for medical malpractice incidents, 
by reducing access to the court system, and that these laws simply enrich 
insurance companies and doctors. 
 
Federal lawmakers are currently studying the potential effect of uniform 
medical malpractice damage limits at the national level.  It is therefore of 
interest to legal scholars, policy makers and the public to determine the 
actual effects of such laws. 
 
We find that limits do not reduce access to the court system, yet reduce the 
incentive to litigate the weakest claims, reduce the average size of 
malpractice awards, and reduce total loss costs (a measure of insurance 
provider payments/losses).  These savings are subsequently passed on to 
consumers. 
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4I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Many states have enacted laws which serve to limit non-economic damages which flow 
from medical liability claims.  These laws were put into effect in the hope of controlling 
medical liability insurance costs, thereby reducing medical costs to consumers and 
preserving or increasing access to health care for individuals.  There exists a large body 
of literature addressing the success or failure of these laws, the conclusions of which are 
somewhat contradictory.  There are important policy implications which derive from 
whether these limits or “caps” are effective, as Federal government seeks to impose 
nationwide tort-control laws including medical liability limits. 
 
A. Brief Description of Limits on Medical Liability Claims 
 
Three types of damages may flow from successful medical liability claims: (1) Economic 
damages; (2) Non-economic damages; and (3) Punitive damages.  Economic damages 
include past and future medical expenses, loss of past and future earnings, loss of 
property, costs of repair or replacement, and loss of employment or business 
opportunities.  Economic damages are objective, verifiable and measurable.  Non-
economic damages include pain, suffering, inconvenience, emotional distress, loss of 
society and companionship, loss of consortium and loss of enjoyment of life.  Non-
economic damages are by definition subjective, and often difficult to verify and measure.  
Punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant and deter future malpractice. 
 
One of the first attempts to address the issue of medical malpractice limits is California’s 
1975 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (“MICRA”).  After numerous legal 
challenges, in 1985 the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of MICRA: 
 
[I]n enacting MICRA the Legislature was acting in a situation in which it 
had found that the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance was posing 
serious problems for the health care system in California, threatening to 
curtail the availability of medical care in some parts of the state and 
5creating the very real possibility that many doctors would practice without 
insurance, leaving patients who might be injured by such doctors with the 
prospect of uncollectible judgments.  In attempting to reduce the cost of 
medical malpractice insurance in MICRA, the Legislature enacted a 
variety of provisions affecting doctors, insurance companies and 
malpractice plaintiffs. 
 
[The limitation on recoverable non-economic damages] is, of course, one 
of the provisions which made changes in existing tort rules in an attempt 
to reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation, and thereby restrain 
the increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums.  It appears 
obvious that this section – by placing a ceiling of $250,000 on the 
recovery of noneconomic damages – is rationally related to the objective 
of reducing the costs of malpractice defendants and their insurers.1
MICRA made four important changes to the medical liability tort system: (1) it imposed a 
$250,000 cap on awards for non-economic losses in medical malpractice lawsuits;2 (2) it 
allowed defendants to introduce evidence showing that a plaintiff had received 
compensation for a portion of his or her losses; (3) it authorized trial courts to require 
periodic payments for future damages, in lieu of lump sum awards; and (4) it imposed 
limits on the contingency fees that lawyers can charge their clients.   
 
As medical costs have dramatically increased over the past decade, the public’s interest in 
the medical liability tort system has grown, and a number of scholarly studies of the 
system have appeared.3 There is a growing body of research that attempts to evaluate the 
effects of damage limits on the cost of both medical liability insurance and health care.  
Much of this research has focused on the efficacy of caps applied to non-economic 
damages.  Recent research has also sought to determine the link between increases in 
 
1 Lawrence Fein, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Permanente Medical Group, Defendant and Appellant  
S.F. No. 24336, Supreme Court of California, 38 Cal. 3d 137; 695 P.2d 665; 211 Cal. Rptr. 368; 1985. 
(Intervening footnotes omitted.) 
2 The law defines non-economic losses as “pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, 
disfigurement and other non-pecuniary damage.” CA Civil Code, §3333.2(a) 
3 For example, see Pace, Nicholas M., Daniela Golinelli and Laura Zakaras.  “Capping Non-Economic 
Awards in Medical Malpractice Trials.  California Jury Verdicts Under MICRA,” RAND Institute of Civil 
Justice.  (hereafter “RAND report”). 
6health care costs and access to health care insurance.4 As a result, legislative bodies at 
both the Federal and State levels are considering changes to the tort system5.
B. Recent Federal and State Legislative Efforts to Control Health Care Costs 
 
Proponents of non-economic damage limits believe that unconstrained non-economic 
damage awards significantly increase the cost of, and access to, health care.  This belief 
has prompted numerous efforts to reform the medical malpractice tort system on a 
national level.  For example, H.R. 4280 provides for a $250,000 cap on non-economic 
damages, which was pending before the U.S. House of Representatives during the 108th 
Congress: 
 
Congress finds that our current civil justice system is adversely affecting 
patient access to health care services, better patient care, and cost-efficient 
health care, in that the health care liability system is a costly and 
ineffective mechanism for resolving claims of health care liability and 
compensating injured patients, and is a deterrent to the sharing of 
information among health care professionals which impedes efforts to 
improve patient safety and quality of care6
In addition, a number of states, including Oregon (Ballot Measure 35, 2004 failed) and 
Nevada (Ballot Question 3, 2004, passed), have recently considered medical liability 
reforms, that were intended to reduce the cost of, and improve access to, health care.7
C. Summary of Findings 
 
4 Sloan, Frank A. and Christopher J. Conover, “Effects of State Reforms on Health Insurance Coverage of 
Adults,” Inquiry 35 (3) (Fall 1998), pp 280-293. 
5 For example, see H.R.4280. Title: To improve patient access to health care services and provide improved 
medical care by reducing the excessive burden the liability system places on the health care delivery 
system.  Sponsor: Rep Greenwood, James C. [PA-8] (introduced 5/5/2004).  Related Bills: H.RES.638, 
H.R.5, H.R.4275, H.R.4279, S.607.  Latest Major Action: 5/12/2004 Passed/agreed to in House by recorded 
vote: 229 - 197 (Roll no. 166).  Note: On 5/13/2004, H.R. 4280 was laid on the table and its text appended 
to H.R. 4279, pursuant to H.Res. 638. For further action, see H.R. 4279. 
6 H.R.4280; Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004 (Introduced 
in House). SEC. 2. Findings and Purpose. 
7 See, e.g., Steves, David,  “Campaign 2004 / Measure 35: Physicians’ push and lawyers’ pull leaves 
patients in middle”, The Register-Guard, October 3, 2004; Associated Press (Reno) “Nevada decides ballot 
questions on malpractice, education, wages”, USA Today, Election 2004, 11/3/2004. 
7Widely accepted economic principles and the non-profit composition of most medical 
liability insurance carriers, together with the results of empirical research, indicate that 
caps on non-economic damage awards are effective in reducing medical liability 
insurance costs and as a result, health care costs are reduced.  Limits on non-economic 
damage awards reduce the incentive to litigate weak claim and reduce the average size of 
malpractice awards (i.e., severity) - all important determinants of medical costs.  By 
reducing the cost of medical services – and consequently making health insurance more 
affordable – such limits increase the public’s access to health care.   
 
II. DAMAGE LIMITS REDUCE THE INCENTIVE TO LITIGATE THE 
WEAKEST CLAIMS 
 
Economic theory holds that individuals tend to act in their self-interest, given the costs 
and benefits associated with the alternative courses of action available to them.  
Empirical research has validated the theory’s applicability to many types of behavior, 
including the propensity to file lawsuits.  Other things being equal, a higher expected 
payoff from filing a lawsuit will lead to more claims of alleged medical malpractice being 
pursued. 
 
A. Expected Return From Filing a Lawsuit 
 
Three factors determine the size of the payoff expected from filing a lawsuit: (1) The 
probability of obtaining a favorable outcome, such as a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor or a 
negotiated settlement (Pr); (2) The size of the expected award (A); and (3) The expected 
cost of litigating the claim (C).  We can represent the interplay of these factors in 
determining the expected payoff from filing a lawsuit (E*) as follows:  
 
E* = (Pr x A) – (C) 
 
8B. The Probability of Obtaining a Favorable Outcome 
 
The likelihood that an individual plaintiff will prevail in litigation depends primarily on 
the strength of his or her case, although the likelihood that a plaintiff will prevail may be 
increased by the degree to which the jury views the plaintiff as sympathetic.  A 
sympathetic plaintiff with a weak case may be as successful in obtaining a favorable 
award as a less-sympathetic plaintiff with a stronger case. 
 
C. The Size of the Expected Award 
 
The size of the expected award is a function of two factors: (1) the magnitude of the 
alleged damages suffered by the plaintiff; and (2) any limiting or enhancing factors on the 
award.  A limiting factor would be a cap on non-economic damages awards.  An 
enhancing factor would be the availability of punitive damages. 
D. The Cost of Medical Malpractice Litigation 
 
It is costly to pursue damages claims, just as it is costly to defend against them.  2003 
annual legal defense costs, including benefits paid to third parties or their attorneys, 
claims handling, insurance company administrative costs, and other expenses related to 
medical malpractice liability, total approximately $27 billion nationwide.8 This amount 
represents approximately $91 per year, per person in the U.S., or $364 for a family of 
four.  In addition to the out-of-pocket costs associated with litigation, lawsuits require a 
heavy investment of the plaintiff’s (and defendant’s) time.  The time spent on a lawsuit 
cannot be spent on other activities.9
The cost of pursuing litigation has both fixed (Cf) and variable (cv) components.  The 
variable component is a function of the amount potentially at stake.  Other things being 
 
8 Towers Perrin - Tillinghast, “U.S. Tort Costs: 2004 Update, Trends and Findings on the Cost of the U.S. 
Tort System,”  2004. 
9 In economic terms, the time and money spent bringing or defending a lawsuit can be thought of as the 
opportunity cost of litigation – the value of the time and resources that could be spent elsewhere.  
Opportunity costs can be measured and expressed in dollar terms, although we do not do so here. 
9equal, a defendant will fight harder to avoid paying a larger award, and a plaintiff will 
make a greater effort to obtain such an award.  The expected payoff formula can be 
refined to take account of the fixed and variable cost components, as follows: 
 
E* = (Pr x A) – (Cf + cvA) 
 
This formula shows that the decision to pursue a malpractice claim is contingent on the 
probability of proving liability in court, and on the expected size of the settlement or 
award.10 If the expected size of the settlement or award is sufficiently large, even 
plaintiffs with a relatively small probability of successfully proving liability will pursue 
awards.   
 
E. The Propensity to Pursue Malpractice Claims 
 
A meaningful cap11 on non-economic damages limits the expected reward from filing a 
malpractice lawsuit.  Accordingly, a cap (as well as other limitations on the size of 
awards) will reduce the incidence and cost of malpractice claims by discouraging the 
weakest claims, and by encouraging out-of-court settlements.  We model the effects of 
having no cap, as well as caps of $250,000, $500,000 and $900,000, on a claimant’s 
incentive to file suit.12 
Consider a claim of alleged medical malpractice consisting of $400,000 in economic 
damages and $600,000 in non-economic damages.  Assume that meritorious claims have 
 
10 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon and Lee A. Lillard, Settlement out of Court: the Disposition of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XII (June 1983): p. 356; and Farber, Henry S. and 
White, Michelle J., “Medical Malpractice:  An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process,” RAND 
Journal of Economics 22 (2) (Summer 1991), pp. 199-217.  [Hereafter, Farber and White]. 
11 Not all caps on non-economic damages awards are meaningful.  A high cap, or a cap with significant 
exceptions, will not materially alter the plaintiff’s and defendant’s assessment of the expected award’s size, 
and therefore will not be effective in altering the economic incentives to pursue or defend medical 
malpractice claims. 
12 We consider a $900,000 cap because some opponents of MICRA have argued that the original $250,000 
cap should be adjusted for inflation. ($250,000 adjusted for the change in the CPI-U between 1975 and 
2003 is: $250,000 x 184/53.8 = $855,019).  By analyzing the affect of a $900,000 cap, we are not 
suggesting that the cap on non-economic damages should be increased or inflation-adjusted. 
10
an 80 percent probability of success and non-meritorious claims have a 20 percent 
probability of success.  Further assume that the fixed costs of litigating the claim (Cf)
amount to $100,000, and the variable costs (cv) amount to 5 percent of the maximum 
potential award.  Table 1 shows the impact of various caps on meritorious and non-
meritorious claimants.13 
Table 1. Impact of Caps on “Meritorious” and “Non-Meritorious” Claimants 
Economic 
Damages 
Non-
Economic 
Damages CAP 
Prob. 
of win 
Expected gross 
return 
fixed cost of 
litigating 
variable 
cost of 
litigating 
(as % of 
award) 
variable cost 
of litigating 
($) 
Expected 
Value 
A B c d
e=d*{a+if(c>0,
min(b,c),b]} f g 
h=g*{a+if(c>0
,min(b,c),b]} g=e+ f+ h 
PANEL A: Weak Claimants 
$400,000 $600,000 No cap 20% $200,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $50,000 
$400,000 $600,000 $250,000 20% $130,000 -$100,000 5% -$32,500 -$2,500 
$400,000 $600,000 $500,000 20% $180,000 -$100,000 5% -$45,000 $35,000 
$400,000 $600,000 $900,000 20% $200,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $50,000 
PANEL B: Strong Claimants 
$400,000 $600,000 No cap 80% $800,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $650,000 
$400,000 $600,000 $250,000 80% $520,000 -$100,000 5% -$32,500 $387,500 
$400,000 $600,000 $500,000 80% $720,000 -$100,000 5% -$45,000 $575,000 
$400,000 $600,000 $900,000 80% $800,000 -$100,000 5% -$50,000 $650,000 
As panel A indicates, a cap of $250,000 discourages the weak claimant from filing a 
medical malpractice suit by changing the suit’s expected payoff from positive ($50,000) 
to negative (-$2,500).  The cap however would not discourage the strong claimant (see 
panel B).  Panel A also indicates that if caps are set at $500,000 or $900,000, the 
disincentive to litigate marginal claims is eliminated.  In actuality, there would be a 
continuum of outcomes:  as cap limits increase (i.e., are set at higher dollar values) 
additional claims become worth litigating.   Panel B indicates that while a cap of 
$250,000 discourages weak claimants from filing suits, the disincentive disappears when 
the cap is raised to either $500,000 or $900,000.   
 
13 In this context, meritorious claims are assumed to have a higher probability of “winning” (i.e., 80%). 
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In sum, caps on non-economic damages decrease the number of malpractice lawsuits 
filed – primarily by making it less economically attractive for individuals with the 
weakest claims to file suit.  The higher the cap, the less effective of a constraint to 
marginal claim litigation it becomes.   
 
III. CAPS DO NOT APPEAR TO REDUCE ACCESS TO THE COURT 
SYSTEM 
 
Some opponents of caps have argued that they reduce access to the court system by 
preventing injured plaintiffs from hiring attorneys, thereby discouraging them from filing 
lawsuits.   
 
A. Damage Limits Do Not Significantly Reduce the Number of Lawsuits Filed 
 
We have obtained data on the number of medical malpractice lawsuits filed in California, 
the results of which we posit can be generalized to other states.  The empirical evidence 
provides no support for the hypothesis that the existence of damage caps in California 
(not to mention the other conditions imposed by MICRA as described above) has reduced 
access to the court system.  Figure 1 shows estimated medical malpractice filings in 
California on a per-capita basis, for the period 1968-2003.  As the figure makes clear, 
per-capita filings today are higher than they were in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
before MICRA was enacted.  While there has been a modest decline in per-capita filings 
since MICRA’s constitutionality was upheld in 1985, the incidence of lawsuits has 
remained relatively high, and in some years has actually exceeded the number of lawsuits 
(on a per capita basis) reported for 1985.  In short, Californians continue to have access to 
the court system, and attorneys continue to accept medical malpractice cases, 
notwithstanding the cap. 
 
It is reasonable to infer that the relatively modest reduction in filings that may have 
occurred during MICRA’s existence involves primarily the weakest claims – that is, the 
group of claims targeted by MICRA.  As Table 1 demonstrates, the MICRA cap on non-
12
economic damages discourages those with dubious claims from incurring the costs 
associated with a lawsuit, without removing the economic incentive for individuals with 
meritorious claims to hire attorneys and file suit. 
 
Figure 1: Estimated Per Capita Medical Malpractice Filings in California, 
1968 to 200314 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
19
68
19
69
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
Es
tim
ate
dN
um
be
ro
fF
ilin
gs
pe
r1
00
0P
ers
on
s
MICRA passed in 1975
MICRA upheld in 1985
In sum, the available evidence indicates that the cap has not reduced access to the court 
system to any significant degree, and any reduction that has occurred is almost certain to 
involve the weakest claims.15 
14 Source: California medical malpractice filings are estimated based on 1968-2004 “Los Angeles Superior 
Court Filings and Disposition Comparison” prepared by Los Angeles Superior Court Statistics Section.  
Population data is obtained from California Department of Finance – Historical State Population Estimates, 
with Components of Change and Crude Rates (http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/Demograp/repndat.htm) 
15 Figure 1 estimates medical malpractice claims in California per capita. Another important perspective 
on the incidence of such claims can be gained by comparing claims with the number of physicians. In 2003 
an estimated 4,632 medical malpractice lawsuits were filed in California, which is home to 93,171 
physicians.  Thus, one suit was filed in this one year for every 20 doctors. 
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B. Caps do not Significantly Reduce the Number of Claims Made Against 
Physicians 
 
We have obtained complete data on one medical malpractice insurer showing both the 
number of physicians it insures and the number of claims made by its insureds during the 
period 1976 through 2004.16 This data covers all 50 states, and we believe it provides a 
fair representation of frequency rates for other insurance companies.17 
Table 2 shows that the frequency rate on a state-by-state basis for the period 1976 
through 2004.  During the eight years prior to the California Supreme Court’s action in 
upholding MICRA (1978-1985), claims frequency was approximately 23.4%.18 For the 
next eight years (1986-2004), the rate decreased slightly to 22.8%.  This data indicates 
that caps in California do not have a significant impact on the rate at which medical 
malpractice lawsuits are filed.  The slight decrease in claims frequency that has occurred 
since 1985 most likely reflects a reduction in the number of weak or marginal claims 
filed. 
 
16 Source: The Doctors Company.  Underlying exposures have not been adjusted to a base classification. 
The data does not reflect the claims-made experience of large medical groups or medical schools. 
17 Different insurers (and self-insured entities) define ‘claim’ and count ‘claim’ in different ways. They 
include differentiating between a notice of claim, or potential claim reported by a physician vs. an actual 
lawsuit filed and served upon the physician. Some companies count claims by plaintiff, others by 
defendant, in other words if a plaintiff sues 4 doctors and a hospital, depending on how one counts, that 
could be one, four or five claims.  No single uniform standard for counting frequency of claims exists and 
consequently we are unable to aggregate historical data from multiple insurance firms.  We therefore 
present data from a single large firm which underwrites in all 50 states – The Doctors Company – as being 
representative. 
18 We do not include 1976-1977 in our sample as the number of insured doctors outside California is not 
sufficient to provide a representative sample. 
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Table 2. California vs. Non-California Frequency Rates19 
CALIFORNIA   NON-CALIFORNIA  
Year 
 [a] 
Claims 
[b] 
Insured 
Doctors 
[c]=[a]/[b] 
Claim 
Frequency 
 [d] 
Claims 
[e] 
Insured 
Doctors 
[f]=[d]/[e] 
Claim 
Frequency 
 [g]=[c]/[f]-1 
Frequency 
Difference 
1976  40 678 5.9%  0 na 0.00%  Na 
1977  251 106 236.3%  0 na 0.00%  Na 
1978  506 2691 18.8%  1 11 9.30%  102.2% 
1979  640 3575 17.9%  12 94 12.80%  39.8% 
1980  783 4399 17.8%  24 240 10.00%  78.0% 
1981  1,075 5000 21.5%  73 313 23.30%  -7.7% 
1982  1,171 5472 21.4%  112 378 29.60%  -27.7% 
1983  1,464 5880 24.9%  140 484 28.90%  -13.8% 
1984  1,561 5958 26.2%  164 653 25.10%  4.4% 
1985  1,862 5783 32.2%  204 699 29.20%  10.3% 
1986  1,705 5941 28.7%  249 865 28.80%  -0.3% 
1987  1,744 6388 27.3%  367 1412 26.00%  5.0% 
1988  1,781 6798 26.2%  624 2725 22.90%  14.4% 
1989  1,487 6981 21.3%  636 3475 18.30%  16.4% 
1990  1,522 7179 21.2%  633 4058 15.60%  35.9% 
1991  1,591 7232 22.0%  690 4759 14.50%  51.7% 
1992  1,844 6855 26.9%  877 5348 16.40%  64.0% 
1993  1,736 7203 24.1%  1,077 5698 18.90%  27.5% 
1994  1,798 7221 24.9%  1,141 6069 18.80%  32.4% 
1995  1,653 7034 23.5%  1,202 6164 19.50%  20.5% 
1996  1,668 6864 24.3%  1,219 6698 18.20%  33.5% 
1997  1,590 6709 23.7%  1,060 6709 15.80%  50.0% 
1998  1,473 6432 22.9%  1,188 7200 16.50%  38.8% 
1999  1,313 6164 21.3%  926 6521 14.20%  50.0% 
2000  1,297 6147 21.1%  927 6139 15.10%  39.7% 
2001  1,287 6403 20.1%  1,121 7006 16.00%  25.6% 
2002  1,403 6778 20.7%  1,378 8833 15.60%  32.7% 
2003  1,471 7038 20.9%  1,455 9636 15.10%  38.4% 
2004   1,161 7845 14.8%   899 9463 9.50%   55.8% 
1994-2004  16,114 74,635 21.6%  12,516 80,439 15.6%  38.8% 
1978-1985  9,062 38,758 23.4%  730 2,873 25.4%  -8.0% 
1986-2004   29,524 129,213 22.8%   17,669 108,777 16.2%   40.7% 
As Table 2 also shows, notwithstanding MICRA, claim frequency remains significantly 
higher in California than in the other 49 states (some of which have caps).  During the 
period 1986-2004, frequency rates in California exceeded non-California rates, on 
 
19 Source: The Doctors Company.  Underlying exposures have not been adjusted to a base classification. 
The data does not reflect the claims-made experience of large medical groups or medical schools. 
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average, by 40.7%.  The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) reports that frequency 
rates average approximately 15% nationwide.20 
IV. STATES WITH CAPS EXHIBIT SMALLER AVERAGE PER-CLAIM 
MALPRACTICE PAYMENTS 
 
More than half of all states have enacted caps to restrain the rate of growth in health care 
costs and to preserve access to affordable health care.  Not all these caps, however, are 
equally affective.  Some states, such as Hawaii, have adopted caps but provide for 
exceptions that make allow for the relatively easy circumvention of the cap.  Other states 
have set caps on non-economic damages at a relatively high level, thereby weakening or 
eliminating the disincentive to pursue non-meritorious claims.  Nevertheless, states with 
caps tend to report smaller average per-claim payments. 
 
Table 3 shows average payments per malpractice claim, by state, for 2004.21 Note that 
heavily populated, industrialized states without caps (e.g., New York, 44th and Illinois, 
50th) ranked on average much lower (i.e., higher per-claim payments) than comparable 
states with caps.  Overall, states with caps held the four lowest spots (Michigan, 
Louisiana, California and Utah) and six of the eight lowest (Kansas and South Dakota). 
 
20 Congressional Budget Office, “Limiting Tort Liability for Medical Malpractice,” Economic and Budget 
Issue Brief, January 8, 2004. 
21 Source: National Practitioners Data Bank (“NPDB”). Data through March 2004.  Note, the Data Bank’s 
rules require the reporting only of doctors named in final malpractice settlements, so a payment doesn’t 
have to be reported when a doctor’s name is removed from the claim.  Consequently, the Data Bank is 
missing information on some malpractice payments.  It is not clear what effect the missing data might have.  
See e.g., “Doctor Is Out: Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases Is Often Thwarted; Deleting a Physician’s 
Name From a Suit Before Settling Keeps It Out of Data Bank; Dubbed the ‘Corporate Shield’” 
Joseph T. Hallinan.  Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition). New York, N.Y., Aug 27, 2004.  p. A.1. 
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Table 3. 2004 Average Payment Per Malpractice Claim  
(Ranked From Lowest to Highest)22 
State23 
Average 
Payment Rank CAP State 
Average 
Payment Rank CAP 
Michigan $124,747 1 Yes Missouri $256,790 27 Yes 
Louisiana $129,941 2 Yes North Dakota $257,478 28 Yes 
California $132,696 3 Yes Mississippi $261,163 29 Yes 
Utah $133,917 4 Yes Ohio $273,675 30 Yes 
Wyoming $140,850 5  Indiana $277,769 31 Yes 
Nebraska $178,311 6  Georgia $278,575 32  
Kansas $181,550 7 Yes Oklahoma $280,888 33 Yes 
South Dakota $191,738 8 Yes Montana $291,000 34 Yes 
Kentucky $191,852 9  Arizona $304,307 35  
Washington $196,295 10  New Jersey $312,665 36  
Nevada $198,175 11 Yes Idaho $320,130 37 Yes 
Tennessee $199,456 12  Maryland $320,347 38 Yes 
Texas $205,812 13 Yes Maine $320,637 39  
New Mexico $206,309 14 Yes Minnesota $328,401 40  
Vermont $210,341 15  Pennsylvania $329,689 41  
Alabama $216,200 16  Rhode Island $329,994 42  
Alaska $217,397 17 Yes Connecticut $338,238 43  
West Virginia $218,233 18 Yes New York $360,754 44  
South Carolina $218,884 19  North Carolina $364,729 45  
Florida $221,293 20 Yes Massachusetts $368,260 46 Yes 
Colorado $222,083 21 Yes Iowa $386,197 47  
Virginia $234,371 22 Yes District of Columbia $388,125 48  
Arkansas $239,962 23  Hawaii $393,589 49 Yes 
Wisconsin $242,131 24 Yes Illinois $455,420 50  
Oregon $248,685 25  Delaware $655,767 51  
New Hampshire $253,016 26      
In 2004, states with caps (Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) averaged $234,136 per payment, with an 
average ranking of 21.  In contrast, states without caps averaged $295,910 per payment, 
with an average ranking of 30 – a significant difference. 
 
22 Source: National Practitioners Data Bank (“NPDB”).  Data through March 2004. 
23 Includes District of Columbia.  Data for American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Virgin Island, Armed Forces 
Europe, Northern Marianas, Guam, and Armed Forces Pacific not reported. 
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V. IMPLEMENTING CAPS IN STATES WHERE NONE CURRENTLY 
EXIST, CAN REDUCE PAID LOSSES BY AS MUCH AS 30% 
 
Having no cap in place essentially enables a relatively small number of plaintiffs to 
secure very large awards, thereby increasing the size of the average claim paid.  For a 
specific sample of malpractice claims, RAND has measured payments under a system 
with and without caps24. They show that removing the cap (but leaving the fee limits in 
place; in effect measuring just the effect of the cap) would raise recoveries to by 43.75 
percent.25 Conversely, this implies a 30.43 percent reduction should caps be imposed 
where none previously existed.  Applying this percentage to total loss payments in 2004 
(as reported by the National Practitioner Data Bank, “NPDB”) for all states that currently 
have caps, indicates that removing the cap would have increased loss payments by 
approximately $206 million; see Table 4.26 Conversely, imposing caps on the states 
which currently do not have them, would have reduced loss payments in 2004 by 
approximately $251 million; see Table 4.  This reduction in loss payments would have 
been reflected in reduced medical liability insurance premiums and, eventually, in 
reduced consumer costs. 
 
Table 4. NPDB Reported Paid Losses, and effect of eliminating caps on states that 
have them, and effect of imposing caps on states that do not have them 
States with Caps 2004  States without Caps 2004 
Alaska  $               1,661,500 Alabama  $                3,112,500 
California  $             57,330,050 Arizona  $              22,414,000 
Colorado  $             12,103,750 Arkansas  $                3,135,000 
Florida  $             81,343,750 Connecticut  $              22,666,500 
Hawaii  $               7,130,250 DC  $                9,070,000 
Idaho  $               3,007,250 Deleware  $                5,724,000 
Indiana  $             32,090,250 Georgia  $              35,946,000 
Kansas  $               5,973,500 Illinois  $              72,305,250 
Louisiana  $               8,838,250 Iowa  $                4,547,550 
Maryland  $             23,546,000 Kentucky  $              10,985,500 
Massachusetts  $             24,225,750 Maine  $                4,250,000 
24 See RAND report for a full description of data sample. 
25 See, RAND report, Figure 4.2, p. 38. 
26 This calculation assumes that the sample is representative of the larger NPDB population.  For additional 
details on the RAND sample, see RAND report, p. 14-15.  According to RAND, there is evidence that 
smaller-value awards may be underreported in their sample (RAND report, p 13). 
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Michigan  $             29,703,000 Minnesota  $                9,815,000 
Mississippi  $               4,024,800 Nebraska  $                3,655,500 
Missouri  $             14,673,750 New Hamshire  $                4,042,000 
Montana  $               3,697,500 New Jersey  $              67,858,250 
Nevada  $               8,414,500 New York  $            189,875,750 
New Mexico  $               3,496,250 North Carolinda  $              42,087,250 
North Dakota  $               2,170,750 Oregon  $              10,115,750 
Ohio  $             46,192,500 Pensylvannia  $            273,515,500 
Oklahoma  $               8,651,250 Rhode Island  $                   895,000 
South Dakota  $               3,240,000 South Carolina  $              12,600,250 
Texas  $             64,034,550 Tennessee  $                8,495,750 
Utah  $               4,078,250 Vermont  $                   355,000 
Virginia  $             10,738,750 Washington  $                8,138,200 
West Virginia  $               5,396,000 Wyoming  $                   372,000 
Wisconsin  $               6,036,750 
Total  $           471,798,900   Total  $            825,977,500  
Increase 43.75%  $           678,210,919   Reduce  30.43%                574,593,043  
Change  $           206,412,019   Change  $           (251,384,457) 
The changes shown in Table 4 only reflect the direct costs of the medical malpractice tort 
system.  They do not reflect the costs of defensive medicine and other indirect costs that 
vary with limitations on awards.  Table 4 also does not reflect the costs resulting from the 
additional claims that would have been filed in the absence of the cap (see Table 1). 
 
VI. CAPS REDUCE MEDICAL LIABILITY INSURANCE PREMIUMS BY AS 
MUCH AS 43% 
 
Medical liability insurance premiums, like all insurance premiums, are primarily 
determined by the insurer’s cost of providing insurance and paying claims.  Over time, 
increases in these costs must be passed along to policyholders, in the form of higher 
insurance premiums.  The evidence shows that by reducing the cost of the medical 
malpractice tort system, caps significantly reduce malpractice insurance premiums. 
 
A. States With Caps Benefit From Lower Medical Liability Premiums 
 
In addition to observing the correlation between loss costs and premiums, we compare 
medical liability insurance premiums in states with and without caps. Not surprisingly, 
insurance premiums in states without caps are significantly higher.  Figure 2 shows 
19
medical liability insurance premiums for the five states with the largest share of the 
insurance market. 27 
Figure 2: 2004 Liability Insurance Premiums, by State and Specialty28 
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As Figure 2 shows, medical liability premiums are significantly lower in California than 
in the other four states, each of which (until recently) lacked strong liability reforms.29 
For example, in Florida, internists pay approximately $49,000 (242 percent) more per 
year than their counterparts in California; General Surgeons pay approximately $209,000 
(308 percent) more per year; and Obstetricians pay approximately $187,000 (208 percent) 
 
27 Data represents manual rates for specific mature claims-made specialties with limits of $1 million/$3 
million.  Rates reported should not be interpreted as the actual premiums an individual physician pays for 
coverage.  They do not reflect credits, debits, dividends or other factors that may reduce or increase 
premiums.  These five states represent almost forty percent of the physician liability insurance market.  
Data shown represents the highest rate (by county and provider) in each state.  For comparison, average 
rates for internal medicine (across all counties and providers) are $12,017 and $41,999 for California and 
Florida respectively; a difference of 250%.   
28 Source: Medical Liability Monitor, October 2004 (Vol. 29, No. 10, p. 2). 
29 The Texas Legislature adopted a cap in 2003. 
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more per year.  This comparison provides strong evidence that limits on non-economic 
damages hold down medical liability insurance premiums.   
 
B. Legislative changes in the state of Oregon – where limits were imposed and 
subsequently removed – provide strong evidence on the effects of non-
economic damage limits 
 
In 1987, the Oregon legislature passed medical liability reforms that imposed a cap of 
$500,000 on non-economic damages.  Twelve years later, in 1999, the Oregon Supreme 
Court removed the cap.  Figure 3 shows the premiums paid by internal medicine 
specialists both before, during, and after the cap was in effect. 
 
Figure 3: Impact of  Non-Economic Damages Caps on Medical Liability 
Insurance Premiums in Oregon30 
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30 Source: Northwest Physician Mutual Insurance Company. 
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In 1999, the inflation-adjusted average premium for internal medicine was $4,808.  By 
2004, the premium had risen to $12,247, an increase of 155%. 
 
C. Limits on non-economic damages imposed at the federal level would cause 
medical malpractice premiums to fall by 25%-30%. 
 
Several studies have attempted to estimate the effect of removing or implementing a cap 
on non-economic damages.  One study finds that premiums are approximately 17 percent 
lower in states that cap awards than they are in states that have no cap.  These results 
suggest that removing caps in states that have them would cause an increase in medical 
liability premiums of on average 20.5 percent.31 The CBO estimates that if caps (and 
other reforms) were imposed at the federal level, medical malpractice premiums 
ultimately would average 25 - 30 percent less than under current law.32 These estimates 
indicate that removal of a cap from a state that already has one would bring about an 
increase in medical liability insurance premiums of 33 percent to 43 percent.   
 
VII. CAPS DO NOT GENERATE EXCESS PROFITS FOR INSURERS OR 
PHYSICIANS 
 
Some opponents of caps contend that the reduction in loss payments resulting from caps 
do not produce savings for consumers.  Instead, they argue that the benefits have gone to 
medical liability insurance underwriters or physicians, enabling them to make supra-
competitive profits.33 We can find no reliable evidence to support this argument. 
 
A. Medical Liability Insurance Companies Face Strong Market Competition 
 
31 See, Thorpe, Kenneth E.  “The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends And the Impact of State Tort 
Reforms” Health Affairs, January 21, 2004, p. w4-w20. 
32 Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate March 10, 2003. H.R. 5 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-
cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003. As ordered reported by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary on March 5, 2003. p. 4. 
33 Supra-competitive profits are defined here as profits superior to those that would exist under a state of 
unregulated or unhindered competition. 
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Economic theory holds that in competitive markets, prices must be high enough to enable 
firms to cover their costs and earn a competitive rate of return.  If market conditions 
temporarily allow firms to earn returns exceeding their costs (including the cost of 
capital), new firms will enter the market or existing firms will expand and drive down 
prices, thereby eliminating any excess profits.  Similarly, if competition pushes prices 
below the point where firms are able to earn a reasonable return on their capital, some 
firms will leave the market, causing prices to rise.  Thus, the competitive process tends to 
force prices to the level where firms are able to cover their costs and earn a competitive 
return, but not an excessive return. 
 
Medical liability insurance companies are not exempt from the competitive forces that 
keep prices and profits in check elsewhere in the economy.  To the contrary, the evidence 
indicates that competition within the insurance industry is vigorous.  As the GAO found, 
“competition among insurers can put downward pressure on premium rates, even to the 
point at which the rates may, in hindsight, become inadequate to keep an insurer 
solvent.”34 
B. Physician-Owned Medical Liability Insurance Companies Have No Incentive 
to Retain Excess Profits 
 
Many physician medical liability insurance companies are physician-owned, nonprofit 
mutual insurance companies (e.g., Medical Insurance Exchange of California, NORCAL 
Mutual Insurance Company, and The Doctors Company35).  As mutually-owned 
companies, these insurers retain some of their earnings in order to increase the company’s 
capital base and protect its long-term solvency from unforeseen future risks.  When they 
enjoy strong profit years, these companies distribute dividends to their shareholders or 
premium rebates to their policyholders. 
 
34 United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, June 2003, Medical 
Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed to Increased Premium Rates. GAO-03-702, p. 
40. 
35 Some carriers, such as CAP-MPT, are required by law to operate at a break even level.  See California 
Insurance Code 1280.7. 
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Because physicians are both the shareholders and the customers of these mutual 
insurance companies, the companies have a built-in incentive to return the savings 
resulting from caps to physicians.36 Therefore, even if these companies had the market 
power to raise premiums above competitive levels, they would have no incentive to do 
so.   
 
C. Medical Liability Insurers in States that Have non-economic damage Limits 
do not Make Excessive Profits 
 
One way to determine if caps enable medical liability insurers to earn supra-competitive 
profits is to examine the companies’ return on equity.  Again, California serves as a good 
testing base from which to examine this issue.  
 
Table 5 shows that, as measured by return on equity, medical liability insurers in 
California, where a cap is in effect, are not earning excess profits.  During the 1990-2003 
period, annual nominal returns ranged from –13.6 percent to +13.5 percent, with an 
average return of +3.16 percent.  By comparison, the risk-free return (e.g., the constant 
maturity return on one year U.S. Treasury Bonds) during this same period averaged +4.75 
percent.  In other words, between 1990 and 2003, medical liability insurance companies 
earned less than the risk-free rate (i.e., negative risk-adjusted returns).  Thus, medical 
liability providers are not only failing to earn excess profits; in an economic sense they 
are not earning profits at all. 
 
36 The competitive market ensures that the savings passed on to physicians are in turn passed on to 
consumers. 
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Table 5. Return on Equity for California Medical Liability  
Insurance Providers37 
Year 
Total Shareholder 
Equity 
Net Income after 
rebates and tax Return on equity 
Return on Constant maturity 
one year U.S. T-Bond 
1990 $      258,675,160 $    14,042,355 5.43% 7.89% 
1991 $      294,281,331 $    22,453,900 7.63% 5.86% 
1992 $      329,931,078 $    23,305,219 7.06% 3.89% 
1993 $      355,890,808 $    19,715,366 5.54% 3.43% 
1994 $      388,624,908 $    52,597,994 13.53% 5.32% 
1995 $      456,368,809 $    35,283,277 7.73% 5.94% 
1996 $      489,534,893 $    16,282,051 3.33% 5.52% 
1997 $      811,915,697 $    69,822,289 8.60% 5.63% 
1998 $      851,928,288 $    66,324,728 7.79% 5.05% 
1999 $      841,356,537 $    55,348,931 6.58% 5.08% 
2000 $      839,121,338 $    52,342,106 6.24% 6.11% 
2001 $      777,665,995 $  (74,585,008) -9.59% 3.49% 
2002 $      742,336,385 $(100,801,838) -13.58% 2.00% 
2003 $      729,665,066 $  (87,656,969) -12.01% 1.24% 
Medical liability insurance companies whose first state of business is California (i.e., the 
majority of their revenue is generated in California) typically exhibit financial 
performance that is similar to firms doing most of their business in other states.  In cases 
where significant differences do exist, California companies appear to under-perform 
their peers in other states.   
 
Table 6 shows the average net income, average policyholder’s surplus, average loss 
reserves, and average net underwriting income for companies whose primary line of 
business is medical liability insurance.  Data is grouped by state and represents equally 
weighted averages38. States that do not have an insurance company whose primary line 
of business is medical malpractice and that generates most of its revenues in that state are 
not included in the table.  This selection process allows us to present operating results 
that primarily reflect the unique operating conditions prevailing in each state. 
 
37 Aggregate data for Cooperative of American Physicians/Mutual Protection Trust (CAP/MPT), Medical 
Insurance Exchange of California (MIEC), NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company, American Healthcare 
Indemnity Company and SCPIE Indemnity Company, The Doctor’s Company. 
38 Equally weighted average means the relative sizes of the companies within each state is not factored into 
the calculation of mean. 
25
Table 6:  Medical Liability Insurance Firms’ 2003 Average Net Income, 
Policyholder’s Surplus, Loss Reserves, and Underwriting Income39 
State40 
Average of 
Net Income 
($000) 
Rank 
Max=
30 
Average of 
Policyholders’ 
Surplus ($000) 
Rank 
Max=
30 
Average of 
Loss Reserves 
(%) 
Rank 
Max=
30 
Average of Net 
Underwriting 
Income ($000) 
Rank 
Max= 
30 
AZ $1,739 9 $127,250 8 69% 13 ($13,067) 18 
CA41 ($5,170) 27 $119,572 9 64% 18 ($18,561) 22 
CO ($274) 22 $84,608 14 44% 28 ($4,564) 7 
CT $345 19 $67,689 17 87% 2 ($14,993) 20 
DC ($4,900) 26 $70,372 16 64% 16 ($13,899) 19 
FL $1,021 15 $75,532 15 62% 22 ($7,685) 12 
GA $52 20 $177,177 4 64% 17 ($25,744) 25 
IA ($332) 23 $14,286 27 12% 30 ($860) 4 
IL $2,537 8 $172,211 5 76% 9 ($58,746) 28 
LA $2,588 6 $62,120 18 75% 10 ($4,896) 10 
MA $13,229 2 $230,000 3 78% 6 ($63,658) 29 
MD $1,258 14 $113,427 11 68% 14 ($25,478) 24 
ME ($6,364) 29 $48,407 21 63% 20 ($9,094) 14 
MI $9,615 3 $170,915 6 76% 7 ($12,077) 17 
MN $4,273 4 $118,158 10 80% 4 ($8,206) 13 
MO ($2,159) 25 $29,145 26 61% 25 ($2,805) 6 
MS $999 16 $60,244 19 83% 3 ($10,617) 16 
NC $2,553 7 $35,084 24 63% 21 $462 1 
NJ ($2,051) 24 $45,952 22 48% 27 ($15,767) 21 
NY ($89,150) 30 $266,391 2 80% 5 ($153,829) 30 
OH ($6,208) 28 $145,653 7 72% 12 ($25,833) 26 
OR $834 17 $9,756 30 61% 24 $133 2 
PA $1,738 10 $106,716 12 88% 1 ($19,290) 23 
TN $1,738 10 $85,442 13 60% 26 ($9,461) 15 
TX $19,154 1 $357,760 1 74% 11 ($26,660) 27 
UT $1,457 13 $36,428 23 76% 8 ($4,715) 9 
VA $665 18 $10,284 28 61% 23 ($983) 5 
WA $2,909 5 $30,442 25 63% 19 ($4,675) 8 
WI $1,587 12 $54,048 20 67% 15 ($5,819) 11 
WV ($42) 21 $10,202 29 34% 29 ($71) 3 
Mean ($1,545) $97,842  66%  ($18,715) 
Max $19,154  $357,760  88%  $462  
Min ($89,150) $9,756  12%  ($153,829) 
39 AM Best Key Rating Guide, 2004 Edition.  Data represents all insurance companies where medical 
malpractice was listed as the first line of business (i.e., majority of business generated from medical 
malpractice insurance).  Total states represented equals 30. 
40 State indicates first state of business ( i.e., majority of revenue generated in indicated state). 
41 Includes: Everest Indemnity Insurance Co; Claremont Liability Ins Co; American Healthcare Indemnity 
Co; SCPIE Companies; SCPIE Indemnity Company; Doctors Company Ins Group; Dentists Insurance 
Company; MIEC Group; Medical Insurance Exchange of CA; Doctors Company Interinsurance Exchange; 
California Healthcare Ins, RRG; NORCAL Group; NORCAL Mutual Insurance Co; Professional Undrw 
Liab; Health Providers Ins Recip RRG; Podiatry Ins Co America Mut Co; MedAmerica Mutual RRG Inc; 
Underwriter for Professions; NCMIC Group; and NCMIC Insurance Company. 
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As Table 6 indicates, the performance of medical liability insurance companies operating 
in California, as measured by net income and net underwriting income, is significantly 
below-average.  California companies rank 27 and 22, respectively, out of 30 states for 
which data is available.  This comparison provides additional evidence that California 
insurance companies are not earning supra-competitive profits, and, in fact, are relatively 
less profitable than their counterparts in other states.  As measured by average net 
income, California medical liability insurance companies rank 27th out of 30 states, 
besting only New York, Ohio and Maine – none of which have caps. 
 
In summary medical liability insurance companies writing policies in California are not 
charging, and do not have either the incentive or ability to charge, excessively high 
premiums.  Nor are these companies earning excessive rates of return.  Even if 
California’s malpractice doctor-owned insurance companies were inclined to seek excess 
profits, the unity of ownership and customer base would thwart or render harmless such 
efforts.  Thus, both economic analysis and empirical research support the conclusion that 
the savings from reduced liability insurance premiums are passed through to consumers. 
 
VIII. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM A FEDERAL CAP 
 
The decrease in medical liability costs resulting from a caps on non-economic damages 
would generate significant savings for states’ health care systems, both directly and 
indirectly.  Initially, the additional savings would accrue to health care providers.  
Because the health care system is both interconnected and highly competitive, however, 
savings generated in one segment of the system eventually are transmitted to the 
remaining segments.  Thus, when health care providers pay less for malpractice 
insurance, these savings are ultimately passed along to the payers – employers providing 
health insurance, workers, consumers and taxpayers.42 
42 The GAO found that “hospitals and physicians incur and pass on to consumers additional expenses that 
directly or indirectly relate to medical liability.  Therefore, estimates of higher malpractice premiums – 
taken by themselves – understate the full effect of medical liability costs on national health expenditures.”  
GAO, “Medical Liability:  Impact on Hospital and Physician Cost Extends Beyond Insurance, September 
1995. 
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Figure 4 summarizes the incidence of the higher costs that would result from an increase 
in the $250,000 cap on non-economic damages under MICRA. 
 
Figure 4:  Who Benefits from the Implementation of Caps? 
SAVINGS FROM: ACCRUE TO: AND PASS ON TO: 
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A. An Decrease in the Cost of Health Care Would Increase Health Insurance 
Coverage 
 
A fundamental tenet of economics is that, for most goods and services, an decrease in 
price causes a increase in demand. Consequently, we can be certain that decreases in 
health insurance premiums resulting from the implementation of caps would lead to a 
decrease in the number of individuals electing to go without coverage. 
 
B. Some Businesses Would Respond to Decreased Health Insurance Premiums 
by Increasing Coverage  
 
Empirical evidence shows that employers continually evaluate whether to offer health 
insurance coverage to their employees, even when the economy is robust.  Research 
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published by the U.S. Department of Labor has shown that an decrease in the cost of 
premiums increases the likelihood that a firm will offer health insurance.43 
C. An Decrease in Health Insurance Costs Would Increase Participation in 
Health Insurance Programs, Particularly by Low-Income Workers 
 
If employees are enabled to pay less for health insurance, more will choose to buy 
coverage.  A growing body of research tests the sensitivity of employee behavior to 
health insurance costs.  Studies have shown that health insurance price elasticity ranges 
from minus 0.1 to minus 0.4.  These findings can be interpreted to mean that a 10% 
decrease in the price of health insurance will lead to a 1-4% increase in the number of 
people who choose to purchase health insurance.44 These numbers can be substantial 
when measured against the total population of the United States (or more specifically in 
states that currently do not have caps). 
 
IX. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A FEDERAL CAP IS LIKELY TO HAVE 
BENEFICIAL EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILTY OF HEALTH CARE 
 
As the above empirical results have shown, caps appear to have favorable effects on both 
the supply of, and access to, health care provided by physicians and hospitals.  
 
A. A Federal Cap Would Allow Physicians to Establish Practices in States 
Where Liability Costs are Currently too Severe 
 
43 Leibowitz, Arleen and Michael Chernew, “The Firm’s Demand for Health Insurance,” U.S. Department 
of Labor, July 17, 1992. 
44 See, e.g., Marquis, Susan M., and Long, Stephen H., “Worker Demand for health Insurance in the Non-
group Market,” Journal of Health Economics, 1995; Sheils, J., et al, Health Insurance and Taxes: The 
Impact of Proposed Changes in Current Federal Policy-Technical Appendix. National Coalition on Health 
Care, October 1999; Ringel, Jeanne S., Susan D. Hosek, Ben A. Vollaard and Sergej Mahnovski, The 
Elasticity of Demand for Health Care A Review of the Literature and Its Application to the Military Health 
System, Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 
undated. 
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Physician supply in any location and in any specialty depends, in part, on expected 
income.  If one state has higher medical liability insurance costs than other states, and 
providers are temporarily unsuccessful in passing along the additional costs to 
consumers, the expected incomes of providers in that state will fall.  Over time, the 
income disparity will reduce the number of physicians that choose to work in the state 
with higher malpractice costs.45 New York provides a compelling example of this 
problem: 
 
The cost of medical malpractice insurance in New York City, Westchester 
County and on Long Island has risen by nearly 150 percent since 1999, 
creating severe financial strains that have limited patients’ access to such 
specialties as obstetrics and gynecology and made New York a ‘‘crisis 
state’’ for doctors, according to a report released yesterday by a hospital 
trade group.46 
B. A Federal Cap Would Enable More Physicians to Set Up Their Practices in 
Low-Income Rural or Inner City Areas 
 
While lower medical liability premiums as a result of a Federal cap would affect all 
health care providers, physicians in rural and inner city would benefit the most because 
their ability to pass on costs is more limited than their suburban counterparts.  According 
to the GAO: 
 
Actions taken by health care providers in response to rising malpractice 
premiums have contributed to reduced access to specific services on a 
localized basis in the five states reviewed with reported problems.  We 
confirmed instances where physician actions in response to malpractice 
pressures have resulted in decreased access to services affecting 
emergency surgery and newborn deliveries in scattered, often rural areas.47 
45 See, e.g., Satterthwaite, Mark A., “Competition and Equilibrium as a Driving Force in the Health 
Services Sector,” In Managing the Service Sector, ed. by Robert P. Inman, Cambridge, pp. 239-67, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
46 Lueck, Thomas J. “Malpractice Costs Up 150% Since 1999, Hospitals Say,”  The New York Times, 
January 6, 2005 Thursday, Late Edition – Final, Section B; Column 1;  Metropolitan Desk; p. 2. 
47 The five states examined are: Florida, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and West Virginia.  Source: 
Medical Malpractice, Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care, United States General 
Accounting Office. GAO-03-836. August 2003, p. 12.   
30
Many rural and inner city areas are medically under-served because these communities 
have higher costs in relation to revenues than do other communities.  To the extent that 
physicians are unable to pass along the cost of malpractice premiums to lower-income 
families, a Federal cap would higher cap would alleviate the provider shortage in rural 
and inner city areas. 
 
C. A Federal Cap Would Encourage Physicians to Enter High-Risk Specialties 
 
High malpractice premiums translate into higher costs for physicians, especially for those 
specializing in obstetrics and other high-risk specialties.  Medical liability premiums are 
disproportionately high among obstetricians and family practitioners who deliver 
babies.48 These high premiums and correspondingly higher costs discourage physicians 
and medical students from specializing in obstetrics or other high-risk specialties: 
 
Medical malpractice is having a profoundly detrimental effect on health 
care in the United States.  Women are having difficulty obtaining 
obstetrical care, trauma surgery is difficult to obtain in some areas, and 
physicians in many states are finding the rising cost and availability of 
professional insurance an impediment to continuing their practices.49 
Mothers-to-be may have to go elsewhere to deliver their babies after July 
1 because physicians here say they can no longer afford the skyrocketing 
cost of malpractice insurance premiums.  Dr. Steve Toadvine stopped 
working in the obstetrics unit at Knox County Hospital last year because 
of the escalating premiums.  Four of his colleagues plan to follow suit in 
less than two months.  The hospital would be the second in eastern 
Kentucky at which physicians stopped delivering babies this year because 
of the escalating costs of malpractice insurance.  Our Lady of Bellefonte 
Hospital in Russell closed its obstetrics unit in January.  “We did not 
anticipate making this decision,” said Dr. Steve Sartori, one of a group of 
nine physicians who deliver babies in Barbourville and Corbin.   “This 
was driven by a rate increase on our liability insurance contract.”50 
48 Stephen A. Norton, “The Malpractice Premium Costs of Obstetrics,” Inquiry, Spring 1997, p. 62. 
49 Manuel, Barry M. “Fix our malpractice system now,” The Boston Globe, February 1, 2003. 
50 Alford, Roger “Insurance fees may close birth center” Associated Press, Friday, May 23, 2003. 
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Obstetrical services, such as prenatal care, are among the most cost-effective forms of 
preventive medical care available.  Any improvement in infant health outcomes provides 
benefits during the individual’s entire lifetime.  Obstetricians, however, have a significant 
exposure to malpractice lawsuits, as is indicated by the relatively high level of their 
malpractice insurance premiums.  Table 7 shows the premiums paid by practitioners in 
Los Angeles, Dade County (Miami), Long Island, and Wayne County (Detroit).   
 
Table 7. 2004 Malpractice Premiums by Specialty51 
Specialty 
Los 
Angeles, 
CA 
Los 
Angeles 
Rank 
Dade 
County, 
FL 
Long 
Island, NY 
Wayne 
County, 
MI 
Allergy   $7,632  1 $33,460  $6,511  $18,016  
Psychiatry (Non-Shock)  $7,632  1 $33,460  $6,511  $19,410  
Pathology   $11,988  3 $83,651  $15,682  $24,607  
Anesthesiology   $13,808  4 $71,700  $22,650  $45,567  
Family Practice (Non-Surgical) $13,808  4 $62,140  $16,130  $40,430  
Internal Medicine (Non-Invasive) $13,808  4 $83,651  $28,635  $37,346  
Radiology (Non-Invasive)  $15,704  7 $131,451  $35,494  $51,891  
Cardiology (Invasive)  $17,616  8 $131,451  $28,635  $78,958  
Pediatrics (Non-Surgical)  $17,616  8 $47,800  $16,130  $35,764  
Ophthalmology   $21,888  10 $69,310  $21,916  $40,440  
Urology   $21,888  10 $83,651  $38,663  $63,096  
Dermatology (Lipo/Cosmetic)  $24,272  12 $83,651  $22,122  $26,974  
Emergency Medicine  $33,772  13 $131,451  $34,257  $92,826  
Otolaryngology (Cosmetic)  $33,772  13 $83,651  $68,448  $86,897  
Proctology   $33,772  13 $95,601  $38,663  $36,148  
General Surgery  $40,436  16 $277,242  $70,677  $144,188  
Thoracic Surgery  $40,436  16 $239,002  $68,448  $165,839  
Cardiovascular Surgery  $46,128  18 $239,002  $68,448  $191,965  
Orthopaedics   $46,128  18 $215,101  $87,866  $173,476  
Plastic Surgery  $58,492  20 $131,451  $68,448  $97,561  
OB/GYN   $66,100  21 $277,242  $117,956  $164,934  
Neurosurgery   $74,660  22 $344,162  $193,502  $226,545  
Average - All Specialties $30,062  na $134,058  $48,900  $84,676  
The differences in malpractice premiums are particularly striking when viewed in terms 
of the number of procedures that must be performed to fund the premiums.  Physicians in 
Los Angeles are reimbursed $4,763 by Medicaid for vaginal delivery, antepartum and 
 
51 Note: Comparison reflects mature annual premium costs for $1 million maximum per case/$3 million 
maximum for all cases in a given year.  Sources: SCPIE Indemnity Co.  (Los Angeles, CA); Florida 
Physicians Insurance Company (Dade County, FL); Professional Liability Mutual Insurance Company 
(Long Island, NY); American Physicians Assurance (Wayne County, MI).  * Policy year for Long Island 
ends June 30, 2004. 
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postpartum care (2004).52 Given the $66,100 premium charged OB/GYN specialists, 
these practitioners must, ignoring all other costs, perform approximately 13.88 deliveries 
simply to cover the malpractice premium.  In Florida, where the reimbursement is 
$4,545, the physician must perform approximately 61 deliveries to cover the $277,242 
premium. 
 
Parents whose infants have imperfect birth outcomes are relatively likely to file a 
malpractice lawsuit, and juries are highly sympathetic to claims involving infants.  High 
malpractice insurance premiums can serve as a powerful deterrent to obstetrical practice, 
particularly in areas where reimbursement rates are low.  These areas typically include 
rural areas with lower patient density, as well as low-income areas where many patients 
do not have health insurance and births are more likely to have medical complications.  
Consequently, the implementation of caps and attending reduction in liability premiums 
for high-risk and general practitioners would promote increased access to health care. 
 
D. A Federal Cap will Allow Physicians to Provide Treatments that Carry 
Relatively high Risks 
 
When a provider agrees to perform a high-risk procedure on a patient, the provider’s 
exposure to a medical liability lawsuit increases sharply.  High-risk procedures, by 
definition, often result in poor outcomes.  Consequently, a provider can minimize his or 
her exposure to litigation by refusing to perform such procedures.  In some cases, 
however, high-risk procedures may be the patient’s best – or only – hope.   
 
X. CONCLUSION 
 
We have analyzed the effects of limits on medical malpractice awards, and the 
consequent effects on insurance premiums, health care costs, and access to health care.  
We find that caps on medical malpractice damage awards unambiguously improve access 
 
52 Including Obstetrical care 1; Obstetrical care 2; Obstetrical care 3; Antepartum manipulation; Deliver 
placenta; Antepartum care only; Antepartum care only 2; and Care after delivery. 
33
to health care and reduce medical expense costs across all levels of the health care 
system.   
 
Figure 5 summarizes the effects described in sections III-IX of this report.  It illustrates 
how the different elements of the medical health system are interrelated and 
interdependent.  One can easily see how decreased costs at one end, as a result of the 
implementation of caps would result in decreased costs throughout the system. 
 
Figure 5:  Effects of Implementing Caps on Non-Economic Damages 
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